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Profit Sharing as a Test of Partnership
It was in the year 1775 that Lord Mansfield introduced into the English law the doctrine of profit sharing
as a test of partnership. A and B were partners. B sold
his share in the partnership to A who gave a bond for the
purchase price bearing interest at five per cent. A further stipulation in the agreement of sale was that A
should pay B for six years, if B should live so long, a certain annuity, the latter in addition to the interest on the
bond and in lieu of the profits of the trade. A became
bankrupt before anything was paid. X, a creditor of A,
brought action against B for indebtedness incurred by A
in the course of trade. B was held liable as a secret partner.
Said Lord Mansfield :1
"This was a device to make more than legal
interest of money, and if it was not a partnership,
it was a crime, and it shall not lie in the defendant's mouth to say, 'It is usury and not a partnership.' "
An eminent hYhglish writer on Partnership has said, 2
in commenting on the above reasoning:
1

Bloxham vs. Pell. 2 Wm. B1. 999. (1775).

21 Lind. Part. 5th Eng. Ed. 16.
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"By treating such transactions as partnerships and not as loans, an amount of confusion
was introduced into this branch of the law which
even the repeal of the usury laws failed to remove."
In the same year the case of Grace vs Smith3 was
decided, upon practically the same facts, and DeGrey, C.
J., delivered the following statement:
"Every man who has a share of the profits of
a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss, and
if any one takes part of the profit he takes a part
of that fund on which the creditor of the tradesman relies for his payment."Sa
The Chief Justice adds further this remark:
"I think the true criterion is to inquire
whether Smith agreed to share the profits of the
trade with Robinson, or whether he only relied on
those profits as a fund of payment; a distinction
not more nice than usually occurs in question of
trade or usury."
In 1793 the case of Waugh vs. Carver' came befor the English Courts. The facts were these. The Carvers and one Giesler were ship agents carrying on separate business houses. It was agreed between them that
Giesler should locate at Cowes and the Carvers at Gosport
and that the business of the two places should be pooled
upon a percentage basis. It was distinctly agreed that
each house should be responsible solely for its own liabilities. The plaintiff brought action against the Carvers
for goods sold and delivered to Giesler. Said Lord Chief
Justice Eyre:
"It is plain upon the construction of the agreement, if it be construed only between the Carvers
and Giesler, that they were not, nor ever meant to
be partners.
They meant each house to carry on
32 Win. Bl.998. (1775).
saHow can there be reliance on a fund which, ex hypotheosi,
does not arise until creditors are paid?
'2 H. E3. 235. (1793).
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trade without risk of each other, and to be at their
own loss."
Nevertheless, upon the authority of the cases already
quoted, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to recovery.
"If, therefore, the principle be true, that he
who takes the general profits of a partnership
must of necessity be made liable to the losses, in
order that he may stand in a just situation with
regard to the creditors of the house, then this is a
case clear of all difficulty. For though with respect to each other these persons were not to be
considered as partners, yet they have made themselves such, with regard to their transactions with'
the rest of the world."
In not any of these cases did the question of estoppel
arise nor was there any reliance by the plaintiffs upon
any attitude assumed by the defendants.
Thus stood the English law in 1820 when the case of
Purviance vs. McClintee' arose. The facts were as follows: Purviance was engaged in the mercantile business
at New Lancaster, Ohio. Samuel Dryden, Jr., was employed as a clerk and was to receive as compensation for
his services one-half of the profits of the business. Dryden received a sum of money from his father which it
was alleged was used in the business. Purviance denied
this. This was an action by the father's executor to recover the money. The Court charged the. jury that if Dryden
was to receive one-half of the profits, he was to be considered as a partner of Purviance. This opinion was excepted to and upon writ of error by defendant, the propriety of this opinion was the question before the Court.
Said Tilghman, C. J.:
"In*considering this matter, we are to distinguish between the effect of an agreement as to the
parties themselves, and as to a third person. If A
and B are about to form a connection in mercantile
'6 S. & R. 259. (1820.)
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business, they may, so far as concerns themselves,
make what terms they please. It it be agreed that
A shall furnish all the stock, and B contribute his
services, in consideration whereof he shall be entitled to one-half the profits, without being subject
to any part of the loss, it is all very fair and very
well between A and B, but as to the world, who
have no means of knowing the secret agreements
of partners, such a condition is not to be permitted. The partnership creditors trust to the partnership stock, and therefore, no man shall be allowed to lessen that stock, by taking part of the
profits, without incurring the responsibility of a
partner." 5a
After citing the English cases already reviewed, the
learned justice continued:
"It is impossible to know the secret agreements of merchants; it is of importance that creditors should not be deprived of that fund to which
they looked for payment, and to which they had a
right to look, as it was the visible sign held out to
them, by which they were to judge of the amount
of the partnership property. Every man who
trusts the partnership, increases this fund, upon
the faith of its being applied, in the first instance,
to pay the partnership debts; and therefore, no
man shall be suffered to diminish it, under the
pretence of taking part of the profits as a compensation for his services, without being himself responsible in case of loss. This is all fair in principle, and good ii practice." 6a
Almost a half century later in the leading case of
Edwards vs. Tracy,6 Sharswood, J., said:
"It is well settled law in this state that a par5aHow does a distribution of profits lessen the stock?
662 Pa. 374. (1869). Later at nisi prius the same justice reProctor, 7"
ferred to the rule as "an ancient landmark," Lord vs.
Phila. 630. (1869.)
6aHow can debts be said to be paid out of profits, net results
and how does the faith of the creditor increase this fund?
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ticipant in profits directly as such, no matter what
may be the arrangement between the parties is, as
to third persons, a partner: Gill vs. Kuhn, 6 S. &
R. 337; Churchman vs. Smith, 6 Whart, 148. The
reason is that the creditors trust to the common
stock, and therefore no man shall be allowed to lessen that fund by taking part of the profits, which
belong to it without incurring the responsibility
of a partner: Purviance vs. McClintee, 6 S. & R.
159.
Six years after the adoption of this rule in Pennsylvania, Gibson, J., in Miller vs. Bartlett 7 referring
to the same declared it to be "founded in public policy"
altho animadverting against one of the exceptions thereto, arguing that the exception was not founded upon
reason or common sense.
In Wessels vs. Weiss, 8 Fell, J. observed:
"That agreement between the defendants
made them partners at common law and in this
state. The case of Waugh vs Carver, 2 H. Blackstone, 235, decided in 1793, which followed Grace
vs. Smith, 2 Wm. Blackstone, 998, decided in 1775,
was followed and adopted to its full extent in Purviance vs. McClintee, 6 S. & R. 259, in 1820."

Exceptions To The Rule
In Miller vs. Bartlett," these were the facts. B was
engaged in the mercantile business. By agreement in
writing between B and A, the latter agreed to give his
services in the business and in consideration B agreed to
pay A, a salary of $1000 per year and also to allow him a
commission of seven per cent on the profits of the business.
It was shown that this agreement had been carried out. Later B became insolvent and this was an action to make A liable as a partner. It was argued that
715 S. & R. 137. (1826). Gibson J., strangely overlooks the
initial fallacy.
8166 Pa. 490. (1895.)
9Supra note 7
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"all who share profits are partners as to creditors." It was replied that the agreement was not to share
profits but that a sum based upon a percentage of the
profits was the stipulation and English cases were cited
for the distinction. Said Gibson, J.:
"How a commission on profits can be distinguished from an interest in the profits, as such,
I am at a loss to comprehend. The profits cannot
be ascertained before the partnership account is
settled, and then a party, under claim to commission is entitled to what? He is entitled to a compensation equal in amount to so many hundredths
of the sum of the profits. He is said not to have
a specific interest in the profits, as such; he has,
indeed, no lien or specific demand on a particular
fund as a corpus, but neither has a partner, who is
admitted to be so: profits being an incorporeal
essence, and without specific existence before they
are received and enjoyed. It is impossible to discover any difference but what is found in the
terms, between a dividend and a commission: yet
this difference, flimsy as it is, seems to be firmly
established. In Ex parte Hamfer, 17 Ves. 404,
Lord Eldon admits a distinction, while he regrets
it and the cases cited on the part of the defendant,
establish its existence in the English courts beyond the possibility of contradiction."
The learned justice after questioning whether the
exception should be followed determines that the matter
is a commercial question and "we are bound by the decisions of foreign courts on commercial questions, as firmly as we are by our own" and accordingly the judgment
for the defendant was affirmed.
Almost twenty years later the same justice altho entertaining the same doubts concerning the propriety of
the exception is unable to disengage his mind from the
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octopodian tentacls of precedent and thus delivers himself :10
"Now, it has been so often and so invariably
ruled in England and America that a commission
on profits is not such an interest in the concern as
constitutes partnership, that the point is at rest.
What staggers the mind, in this instance, is the apparent shallowness of the distinction. When it is
considered that a commission of fifty per cent, is
no more nor less than an equal division of the
profits; but it must not be forgotten that the distinction is an arbitrary one, resting on authority,
not principle: and that, whatever be the proportion, the relation produced .by a compensation
in the form of a commission is in every instance
the same."
In Edwards vs. Tracy", Sharswood, J., referring to
the exception to the rule says:
'While a right to share in the profits may
constitute a partner, a commission equal to such a
share, as compensation for services, does not. That
this exception to the general rule is founded upon
a distinction without any difference has been generally conceded, and it is used by Baron Bramwell
in Bullen vs. Sharp with great force as an argument against the soundness of the rule itself."
Despite the fact that the exception has been so severely criticized that it "staggered the mind" of the distinguished and learned Chief Justice and together
with the rule itself, has long been repudiated by the English Courts, we find the two persisting in our case law
with pristine vigor.

In Ryder

vs.

Jacobs,12

Dean

J., speaking for the Court said:
"This court, since Miller vs. Bartlet, 15 S. &
R. 137, decided in 1826, and Dunham vs. Rogers,
1 Pa. 255, decided in 1845, has uniformly held,
10 Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 Pa. 255 (1845.)
"162 Pa. 374. (1869.)

12182 Pa. 624.

(1908.)

(1897); Kaufmann vs. Kaufmann, 222 Pa. 58.
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that compensation for services to be paid out of
and contingent on profits, does not of itself constitute the employee a partner."
The rule has no application when the agreement is
to participate in gross recepits, i. e., A agrees to negoti.
ate certain loans for B the latter inter alia to pay to A
thirty cents per barrel for all oil refined by him. The
amount thus stipulated is payable out of gross returns
and whether these be profits or not' 3. Furthermore if the
question arises between the parties and no third persons
are in any wise concerned, the rule is not applicable. The
true contract will then govern 4 .
In Lord vs. Proctor 5 at Nisi Prius, the facts were
that A had loaned P the sum of twenty thousand dollars
($20,000.00) to be paid in two years from date, P to pay
interest at the rate of four thousand dollars ($4000.00)
per annum and furthermore, at the expiration of the period "to make up the amount (if any be wanting) to equal
one-fourth of the net gains" of the business. Held, that
A was not liable on this contract as a partner to third
persons dealing with P, the owner of the business. Said
Sharswood, J.,
"It is very clear that the agreement of July
20, 1868, did not constitute the parties partners
inter se.
They were as between themselves debtor and creditor merely --------------I am unable to
draw any distinction between a stipulation for
compensation for the use of money, or credit, or
anything else proportioned to profit, and the well
settled case of compensation for services. If there
is no such distinction, then the case falls within the
principle as stated by Lord Chancellor Eldon, in
DeHaven's Est. 248 Pa. 271. (1915.)
"3Irwin vs. Bidwell. 72 Pa. 244. (1872.)
'1Kaufmann vs. Kaufmann. 222 Pa. 58. (1908.)

57 Phila. 630.

(1870.)
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Ex parte Hamper, 17 Vesey, 412, and followed by
this Court in Miller vs. Bartlett, 15 S. & R. 137;
Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 Barr. 255; Edwards vs. Tracy, West. Dis. Jan. 3, 1870."
The learned Justice, after referring to the distinction between taking profits and a sum equal to profits and
the criticism on this distinction and declaring the same
"too ancient and well settled a landmark of our law to be
now disturbed," continued:
"I cannot perceive that it will at all help matters now to establish another distinction between
a compensation for services, labor, and skill, and a
compensation for the loan or hire of credit, money,
lands, or goods-an exception to the exception,
and resting necessarily, as it must, upon an equally arbitrary basis."

Statutory Exceptions
The Act of April 6th, 187016, provided as follows:
"That from and after the passage of this act,
it shall be lawful for any person or persons to loan
money to any individual, firm, association or corporation, doing business in this commonwealth,
upon agreement to receive a share of the profits
of such business as compensation for the use of
the money so loaned, in lieu of interest; and such
agreement, shall not render the person or persons
making such loans liable as a co-partners in such
business, to other creditors of such individual,
firm, association or corporation, except as to the
money loaned. Provided, That such agreement
for the loan shall be in writing; and that this act
shall not apply to any loan made by a member of
any such firm, association or corporation, or to
one who holds himself out as such, and shall not
16P. L. 56.
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be construed to repeal or affect any portion of the
law relating to special partnerships: Provided
however, that any person so loaning money under
this act shall not hold himself out as a general
partner, so as to induce credit to be given to any
party or parties, association or corporation, to
whom the loan shall be made."
It has been held that the terms of the statute must
be complied with, otherwise the common law rule will be
applied, i. e., A loans B a sum of money upon an agreement in writing that A shall receive a percentage of the
profits of B's business but there is an additional oral
agreement that A shall receive interest on the loan; held,
the defendant was liable as a partner. Said Fell, J.17:
"As he would have been liable before the Act
of 1870, it remains only to determine whether he
comes within its protection. This cannot be unless he has complied with its provisions. The exemption from liability is on condition that the
agreement shall be in writing and that the share
of the profits shall be held in lieu of interest."
In Hart vs. Kelly's, Paxson, J., expressed the dictum
that altho there might be an agreement to share profits
which would not come within the exemption of the statute if, as a matter of fact here was no participation in
profits because there were no profits, this denial would
be sufficient to send the case to the jury. In Wessels vs.
Weiss, there was a specific averment in plaintiff's statement that profits had been shared as well as interest paid
and neither fact was denied in the affidavit of defense.
The Act of June 15th, 1871,19 provided as follows:
"That individuals and corporations employing
labor may give to employees, in addition to regular
wages, or in lieu thereof, a conditional interest in
17Wessels
vs. Weiss, 166 Pa. 490. (1895.) Scott vs. Kennedy,
201 Pa. 462 (1902.)
2883 Pa. 286.
(1877.)

29P. L. 389.
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the profits of the business, to be regulated and determined by agreement between the parties: and
the employee receiving such conditional share of
profits shall not by reason thereof be deemed liable for the debts or losses of the business, or have
any voice in the management, except in so far as
may be clearly defined in the constitution or
agreement under which the association is organized or operations conducted."
In Mayer vs. Wilson20 the provisions of this act were
invoked by the defendant who alleged that he was not a
partner in the business conducted, being that of running
a hotel, but that he was merely manager receiving in addition to his salary a portion of the profits. Said the Supreme Court:
"To escape from the clear proof of partnership in fact, counsel for appellant contends that
he was not a partner in law, in view of a written
agreement between him and Wilson as to participation in the profits. In support of this the Act of
June 15, 1871, P. L. 389, is cited. That act is entitled, "An act to promote industrial partnerships." It would be stretching the act beyond all
bounds to hold that its provisions were intended
to apply to the employer of those engaged in the
sale of liquors and the management of hotels."

English Rule
The rule of law in England as established by the
cases of Grace vs. Smith and Waugh vs. Carver, already
referred to, continued from the year 1775 until 1860,
modified by the exceptions made by subsequent Courts
and to which reference has been made.
20242 Pa. 473. (1913.) See also Poundstone vs. Hamburger,
139 Pa. 319 (1891.)
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A and B, as partners, were engaged in the business
of iron masters and corn merchants. They became financially embarassed and at a meeting of creditors made
an assignment to certain of the creditors as trustees for
themselves and the general creditors. By the terms of
the deed of trust the trustees were empowered to carry
on the business under the name of the Stanton Iron Company, to execute all necessary contracts and to divide the
net income among the creditors ratably, with the power
vested in the majority of creditors. After the payment
of the indebtedness the property was to be reconveyed to
A and B. Cox and Wheatcroft were named as trustees,
the former, however, never acted and the latter resigned
after acting six months. Later other trustees acted and
became indebted to Hickman for goods supplied the company and gave him bills of exchange, accepted by themselves: "Per proc. The Stanton Iron Company." This
action was on the bills of exchange as given. In the trial
court a verdict was found for the defendants but on motion on leave reserved the verdict was entered for the
plaintiff. By an equally divided court the Exchequer
Chamber affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas.
The House of Lords reversed the judgment.
In holding that the defendants were not liable as
partners because of a participation in profits, Lord Cranworth said:
"It is often said that the test, or one of the
tests, whether a person not ostensibly a partner
is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner,
is whether he is entitled to participate in the prof,its. This, no doubt, is in general a sufficiently
accurate test; for a right to participate in profits
affords cogent, often conclusive evidence that the
trade in which the profits have been made was
218

H. L. Cas. 268.

(1860.)
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carried on in part, for or on behalf of the person
setting
up such a claim. But the real ground of
the liability is that the trade has been carried on by
persons acting on his behalf. When that is the
case, he is liable to the trade obligations and entitled to its profits, or to a share of them. It is not
strictly correct to say that his right to share in the
profits makes him liable to the debts of the trade.
The correct mode of stating the proposition is to
say that the same thing which entitles him to the
one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact
that the trade has been carried on on his behalf:
i. e., that he stood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting ostensibly as the traders
by whom the liabilities have been incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made."
The' true significance of this now historic decision
was not realized for some years. Referring to the matter,
Sir Frederick Pollock has said :22
"As an acute and plain spoken judge has
since said, the effect of Cox vs. Hickman was not
understood at the time. The singular part of the
story is that the misunderstanding was shared by
the law officers of the Crown, all the law lords
(two of whom had been parties to the decision in
Cox vs. Hickman) and, it would seem, the legal
profession generally. Whence the moral may be
drawn that the evolution of law by the unaided
natural process of litigation is an even more subtle
and excellent thing than one would imagine, seeing that, as in this case, it may not take less than
five years for a leading judgment of the ultimate
Court of Appeal to be felt in its full extent."
The case which placed Cox vs. Hickman before the
22

Essays in jurisprudence.

83.
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profession in its true light and significance was that of
Bullen vs. Sharp23. Said Blackburn, J.:
"Prior to that decision, the dictum of De Grey,
C. J., in Grace vs. Smith, 2 W. B. 998, "that every
man who has a share of the profits of a trade
ought also to bear a share of the loss," had been
adopted as the ground of judgment in Waugh vs.
Carver, 2 W. Bl. 235, when it was laid down "that
he who takes a moiety of all profits indefinitely
shall, by operation of law, be made liable to losses,
if losses arise, upon the principle that, by taking
a part of the profits, he takes from the creditors
a part of that fund which is the proper security
to them for the payment of their debts." This decision had never been overruled. The reasoning
on which it proceeds seems to have been generally
acquiesced in at the time; and when, more recently, it was disputed, it was a common opinion (in
which I for one participated) that the doctrine had
become so inveterately part of the law of England
that it would require legislation to reverse it ---------I think that the ratio decidendi is that the proposition laid down in Waugh vs. Carver, 2 W. Bl.
235, viz., that a participation in the profits of a
business does of itself by operation of law, constitute a partnership, is not a correct statement of
the law of England, but that the true question is,
as stated by Lord Cranworth, whether the trade
is carried on on behalf of the person sought to be
24
charged as a partner."
Thus was the arbitrary test of sharing profits repudiated by the English courts and the test of the intention
of the parties restored as the correct principle of law.
23L. R. I. C. P. 86 (1865.)
24
See also Mollwo vs. Wards, 4 Privy Council App. 419, (1872);
Pooley vs. Driver, 5 Chan. Div. 458, (1876); English Part. Act 1890.
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Remarks
It is somewhat astounding to the student of law to
discover in this line of cases as well as other lines that
the attitude of the English Courts-in a monarchyshould be more liberal and less inclined to kow-tow to
precedent than the courts of democratic America. To an
untutored person familiar simply with the general history
of the two countries, it would appear that a liberality and
breadth of view, coupled with perhaps a disregard for
precedent, would characterize the courts of a new country
like America, whereas, in an old country like England
with long established customs and ancient families and
marked distinction of class, an ultra conservatism would
mark the deliberation of the courts. However, compare
the remarks of our Tilghman, C. J., in Purviance vs. McClintee 2 1 where the doctrine of Grace vs. Smith and
Waugh vs. Carver is accepted unquestioningly and later
23
the opinion of Sharswood, J., in Edwards vs. Tracy.
"We are bound to stand super antiquas vias, by our own
decided cases for nothing is truer, or more important, than
the maxim: Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat
quam utilitate prodest," with the broad and sweeping
reasoning of Lord Cranworth in Cox vs. Hickman. Again
in Dunham vs. Rogers 27 we find Gibson, C. J., admitting
that the shallow distinction between taking a share of
profits and taking a sum equal to a share of profits
"staggers the mind" but comforting the reader solely
with the admonition that "it must not be forgotten that
the distinction is an arbitrary one, resting on authority,
not principle."
It is refreshing to turn from this dreary opinion to
the sprightly, cutting criticism of this same distinction
by Bramwell, B., in Bullen vs. Sharp :28
256
2662

S. & R. 259. (1820.)
Pa. 374. (1869.)

271 Pa. 255. (1845.)
281 C. P. 86. (1865.)
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"How many men in a thousand, not lawyers,
could be got to understand that, of the two servants of a firm, the one who received a tenth of
the profits was liable for its debts, and the other
who received a sum equal to a tenth was not?
This, Mr. Justice Story calls "satisfactory." Satisfactory in what sense? In a practical business
sense? No; but in the sense of an acute and subtle lawyer, who is pleased with refined distinctions, interesting as intellectual exercises, though
unintelligible to ordinary men, and mischievous
when applied to the ordinary affairs of life."

Uniform Partnership Act

Section 7- (4) of the Partnership Act provides as
follows:
"The receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that
he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received
in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a
landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount
of payment vary with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the
goodwill of a business or other property by installments or otherwise."29
Thus by legislative enactment the rule of Purviance
vs. McClintee and Edwards vs. Tracey has been eradicated in Pennsylvania and the law of profit sharing as a
test for partnership has been unified and established in
accord with the view of the English Courts in the cases
already cited. By the provisions of Sections 45 and 46
29Act of Mch. 26, 1915, P. L. 18,
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209

the Acts of April 6th, 1870 and June 15th, 1871 have been
repealed.
Under the present law the receipt of profits is cogent
or "prima facie evidence" of the partnership relation
merely but even this inference does not arise in the excases. There is also a complete elimination of the
specious distinction between a share of profits and a sum
equal to such a share. The change in the law is in accord
with the true relation between the parties rather than an
artificial one.
',epted

A. J. WHITE HUTTON.
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MOOT COURT
HARPER v. JENKINS
Negotiable Instruments-Promissory Notes-Endorsementsentation for Payment-Waiver

Pre-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A made a note for $1,000 payable to B in two months. This
note was endorsed by Jenkins for A's benefit and before maturity
was endorsed to Harper by B. No demand for payment to A was
made for seven months, and no notice of non-payment was given
to Jenkins for ten months. Harper offers to prove that Jenkins
agreed when he endorsed it not to insist on demand or notice. The
court excluded the evidence.
Caldwell, for plaintiff.
Cohen, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
BEAVER, J. The question presented in the case at bar is one
of evidence. May a party prove by oral testimony that at the time
of the endorsment of a promissory note it was agreed that the endorser should be absolutely bound for the payment of it, without
the usual demand and notice?
In the trial of the case below,
Harper offered to prove that Jenkins agreed when he endorsed the
note, not to insist on demand or notice. The court excluded the
evidence, evidently on the ground that parol testimony cannot be
introduced to vary the terms of a written contract, and the correctness of that ruling is now before us for decision. The error of
the lower court consists in the assumption that the law regards
an endorsement as a written contract to pay on condition that the
usual demand be made and notice given. Such is not the case.
For where the endorser is himself the real debtor, as in the case of
accommodation notes and bills; or has an assignment of all the property of the maker as security for his endorsement; or where (he
can have no remedy against the maker; or in the case of the drawer of a bill of exchange where the drawee is, and during the currency of the bill continues to be without funds of the drawer; and
in many other such cases demand and notice are necessary and
this circumstance may be proven by oral testimony. The reason
is that in such cases, demand and notice can be of no use, and
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therefor the law does not require them. Barclay vs. Weaver., 19
Pa. 396; Slaymaker vs. Gundaker, 10 S. & R. 75.
That the lower court erred in excluding the evidence is abundantly shown by the case of Marquart's Estate 251 Pa. 73, where
subscriptions to stock of a newly formed corporation were paid
for in promissory notes, and in order that the corporation might
realize thereon, the directors arranged to give a note made by one
of their number to the order of another, and endorsed by the remaining directors, to the bank, which discounted the stock-subscription notes, as collateral security for the payment thereof at
mat-Arity. The bank or its assignee, upon the default in payment
of a stock subscription note was not required to present the collateral note to the maker for payment before it could have recourse to the other endorsers, but was entitled immediately to
proceed against the endorsers or any of them at its option. In
such cases the endorsers were not sureties for the maker of the
note, but for the corporation in its undertaking with the bank. In
the controversy which arose over the notes, it was held that a
party may prove by oral testimony that at the time of the endorsement of a promissory note it was agreed that the endorser
should be absolutely bound for the payment of it without the usual
demand and notice; the contract to pay on condition that the usual
demand and notice be given which is implied from the endorsement
of negotiable instruments is liable to be changed on the appearance of circumstances inconsistent with it, whether these circumstances be shown orally or in writing. The facts of the case at bar
are identical with that case, and despite the fact that we have received no aid whatever from counsel, we are bound to follow the
law as we find it, and therefor the order of the lower court ex
cluding the evidence introduced by Harper is REVERSED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It would be profitless to add anything to the opinion of the
learned court below and its judgment is AFFIRMED.

CORBETT v. TRACTION COMPANY
Joint Negligence-Release of One is Release of All-Defenses of
Contractor-Liability of Contractors and Sub-Contractors
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts of the case at bar are as follows. The Traction Company was repairing its tracks through X, a contractor. X
sub-let the work to Y. Y sub-let the work to Z. While the work was
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being done by Z, a hole was made in the adjacent street into which
Threatening Z with suit, Corbett
Corbett fell and was injured.
got $200 from him and executed a release stating that the $200
was in payment of damages due him by reason of the accident.
He then sued the Traction Company which pleaded the release.
The lower court denied a verdict for the defendant and found for
the plaintiff.
Myers, for plaintiff.
P. Garber, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
SHELLY, J. In the case at bar it is necessary in order to reach
a proper conclusion to determine -(1) whether there was joint
negligence on the part of the Traction Company and the subcontractor Z, and (2) whether a release executed by the plaintiff
Corbett in favor of the sub-contractor should inure to the benefit of
the defendant Traction Company in this case. The answer to the second question depends entirely upon the first and for that reason
will be discussed first.
An examination of the plaintiff's contention brings forth the
fact that his contention is based upon the doctrine found in Wiest v.
Traction Company 200 Pa. 148. In that case there was an action
of trespass for the death of the plaintiff's husband. It appears that
the plaintiff's husband fell over a girder rail lying in the gutter and
received injuries from which he died. The plaintiff in bringing her
suit joined the city of Philadelphia, the contractor and the Traction
Company as defendants. Upon trial of the issue a verdict and judgment was found against the Traction Company. Upon appeal this
judgment was reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded upon
the ground that it was error to join the three in the same cause of
action. It was alleged that each of the parties had a separate and
distinct duty; the city of Philadelphia was liable because of its
failure to keep the highway free and clear of obstruction; the
Traction Company was liable because it negligently permitted a
rail to be placed so as to obstruct the highway and cause the accident and the contractor was chargeable because he acted jointly
with the Traction Company in placing the obstruction on the highway and allowing it to remain there, thus causing the injury. It
was held that it was clearly wrong to sue the city jointly with the
other defendants because the measure of its responsibility was entirely different and that the duty of each was distinctly of a different nature.
The court can readily distinguish the difference in the nature of
the duty which a city owes to its citizens to keep its highways free
and clear of obstruction from the duty imposed upon either a
contractor or a Traction Company in making repairs or in con-
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structing tracks through the streets of a city; but we are unable
to distinguish the duty of traction company from that of the conractors to whom the work has been delegated. Therefore we agree
with the above cited case so far as the distinction applies to cities
and contractors and traction companies but not as to the distinction
of duties as between the contractors and the traction companies.
In Conway v. The Pottsville Union Traction Company, 253 Pa.
211, the action arose against the Traction Company to recover
damages for the death of the plaintiff's husband resulting from injuries occasioned by a defect in a bridgi during the course of reconstruction. Judgment for the defendant non obstante verdicto
was held to be properly entered where it appeared that the defendant and hired a contractor to reconstruct the bridge and such contract was in turn let to a sub-contractor who after the accident obtained a release from the plaintiff. The court in affirming the
decision said that where the cause of action is the same in several
cases founded on tort, the inference is that the defendants
were joint tort feasors and where the defendant proves
a release by the plaintiff to another defendant in an action
on such cause there can be no recovery in the absence
of evidence by the plaintiff to rebut the prima facie case
so established for defendant by showing that the latter's negligence
alone caused the injury. The effect of the relase depends upon
the relation of the defendants as to whether or not it is effective
against all. A release in 200 Pa. 149 supra, would have had no
effect because it was held that there was not such a relationship
as would warrant the defendant's joint liability for the negligence of
the contractor but in the case at bar as has been shown there is such
a relationship and therefore it is effective. The test in determining
whether or not a release or satisfaction in a proceeding founded
on a negligent act is a bar to another proceeding for the same
cause of action is whether there was joint negligence by the party
released, 253 Pa. 211.
In the case at bar the injury resulted from the same cause, i. e.
the hole in the ground which had been made while the construction
was in progress; the plaintiff sustained but one injury arising
from that negligence, therefore we are of the opinion that there
should be but one recovery. When the plaintiff released the subcontractor 'he acknowledged full receipt for the injury arising
from the negligence of the sub-contractor and consequently the
negligence of the Traction Company. Ordinarily an employer is
not liable to third persons for the omission or misconduct of a
contractor, selected with proper care, who retains "independence
of control in selecting the means of doing work," 38 Cyc. 480; but
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there is an exception to this general rule of liability as where the
doing of it casts a duty as to the method of performance and under this exception are included cases of excavation in public streets
when there is a duty to take proper precautions to prevent injuries.
Therefore, since the Traction Company is jointly liable because of
this exception to a general rule, it should follow that any benefit
inuring to the sub-contractor by reasons of the release should also
inure to the benefit of the Traction Company. For the reasons
herein set forth, it is the opinion of this court that the lower
court erred in its findings and therefor its judgment should be
reversed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The traction company committed no crime when it employed X
to repair the tracks, nor did X when he sublet to Y. Nor did Y when
he sub-let to Z. Z did the work and by doing it made the hole in the
road which caused Corbett's injury. In no very accurate way can it
be said that Z and X or Z and Y were joint tort-feasors. One man
did the negligent act and another man is made also responsible
for it but not because he did it, or arranged or contrived for the
doing of it, or because he had reason to expect, and was negligent
in not expecting the negligent act of Z.
It pleases those who make our legal literature, to say however,
that they are joint tort-feasors.
A corollary therefrom is, that, since Corbett who suffered
from the existence of the hole, suffered one damage, one wrong,
he cannot obtain two compensations, and that although all the tortfeasors are liable to give this compensation, their liability is not
joint but alternate. Each is liable to pay if the other does not.
Payment by one discharges all.
It also follows apparently that though Corbett gets no compensation at all, if he gives a release to one, he, without intending
it, gives a release to the others. He can show no partiality. If
'he expresses the release of one, he, ipso facto, expresses the release of all. He may pity the releasee because of his poverty, but
if pity is the motive, it must be indiscriminately attributed to all.
There is much crude and juvenile thinking involved in many
of the discussions of this subject.
In this particular
case however there is a substantial reason for holding
that the release of Z involves the release of the traction
company. The tort, the sole tort, was committed by Z. Only by
a legal fiction, is the company guilty of it. If the only guilty man
has procured a release it is fair that the release shall inure to the
benefits of the innocent company that suffers only by a fictitious
imputation of guilt. The authority cited by the learned court be-
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low may be accepted as an adequate justification of the decision
of the learned court. The judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.

BEAVER ET AL v. HANDLER ET AL
Mortgage Bonds-Foreclosure Sale-Preferred Payment CouponsNo Distinction Between Attached and Detached Coupons-Coupons
In Hands of Other Than Holders of Bonds
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The X Corporation made a mortgage of $50,004 to secure 1000
bonds of $500 each to a banker. It stipulated that from the proceeds of any foreclosure sale, the coupons for interest accrued
should be first paid, and then the bonds themselves. Some coupons
have been detached and to the extent of $1200 were in the hands of
non-holders of bonds. Objection was made by the holders of
bonds with attached coupons to the concurrent participation in
payment of the holders of detached coupons who did not own
the bonds of which they had been a party.
Beaver for Plaintiff.
Handler for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
KELLY, J. This is a suit in equity to determine the disposition of funds realized by the sale of the property of the X corporation. The corporation issned bonds and secured them by a mortgage
on its premises. The mortgage gave priority in payment to the holders of coupons representing accrued interest. This bill is brought
by the holders of bonds, with interest coupons attached, to restrain the payment of coupons which represent accrued interest
but which have become detached and owned by parties not holders of bonds.
The contention of the plaintiffs is so illogical and the law of
Penna. so well settled on the question involved, that a review of a
few cases is all that is necessary to decide the case.
The bonds in this case are negotiable. The coupons are therefore negotiable, and the holder of the coupons may sue thereon
separate from the bonds, 105 Pa. 216; 81 Pa. 254.
Now if the X Corporation had remained solvent the holders
could have brought suit and enforce payment of them with interest from the date of demand and refusal. Does the fact that the
company's property is sold under a mortgage alter the situation?
We think not. The funds in court are subject to these
claims and as priority is given under the terms of the mortgage,
they should be paid first.
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A case similar to the one under discussion is that of Rea,
Trustee App. vs Penna. Canal Co., 245 Pa. 589. In this case the
Canal Co. issued bonds and provided in the mortgage that the coupons representing accrued interest should be paid first out of the
proceeds. The Penna. Railroad Co. purchased many of these coupons and claimed preference in the distribution for the aniount of
the coupons. Owners of bonds with attached coupons objected
to this claim.
The lower court did not allow the claim of the
Railroad Co., but on appeal the decision was reversed. On a second trial and appeal the former adjudication was followed, 249 Pa.
239. In 244 Federal 980, this view of the case was accepted by
that court in an opinion delivered by District-Judge Dickinson in
the following words, "accepting as we do the ruling of the state
court in the proceedings upon the mortgage, we are bound to conclude that under the terms of the mortgage, the interest coupons
have priority of payment over the principle of the bonds in the disThe same
tribution of the proceeds of the mortgaged premises."
case found its way into the Circuit Court of Appeals and that court
impliedly affirmed the decision of the District Court.
Another late Penna. case dealing with the same question is
McDowell, Ex. vs. North Side Bridge Co., 251 Pa. 585. This case
holds that interest coupohs are specialties partaking equally with
the bonds in the privileges and securities of the latter whether
attached or severed.
Real Estate Trust Co. vs. Penna. Sugar Refining Co., 237 Pa.
311, holds that a bona fide holder of coupons detacher from bonds
secured by a corporate mortgage, who is not a holder of the bonds
themselves, is entitled to a preference in the proceeds of a foreclosure sale given to holders of coupons representing accrued interest. This case is exactly like the one we are called upon to
decide, and our decision coincides with it.
The Trustee is therefore directed to pay the holders of detached coupons the amount of their coupons with interest from
The bill restraining the paythe date of demand and refusal.
ment is DISMISSED.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Our task is the proper interpretation of the mortgage. It
stipulates that, from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, "the
coupons for interest, accrued shall be first paid and then the bonds
themselves."
This is reasonably explicit. It does not distinguish
between attached and detached coupons, and there is no appre*ciable reason for suspecting that any distinction between them was
The case cited by the learned court below, McDowell
intended.
v. Bridge Co., 251 Pa. 585, holds that the detaching of a coupon
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does not expose it to the operation of the six year limitation. The
Real Estate Trust Co. v. Sugar Refining Co., 237 Pa. 311, considers
the very question now before us, holding that in the sharing of
the proceeds of a foreclosure sale, there is no preference of coupons
still attached, to those which have been separated from the bonds
of which they had been part.
The judgment of the learned trial court, based as it was on a
number of every appropriate cases is therefore AFFIRMED.

ASKINS v SARAH FORD
Promissory Notes-Principal and Surety-Wife Surety for Husband-Acts of 1887 and June 8, 1893-Cantra.ural Incapacity
of Married Women-Suretyship.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Ford applied for a loan of $300 from Askins, offering his
wife as surety. Askins declined to receive this note, but said if
Mrs. Ford desired a loan he would lend to her on her sole note, and
she could do what she pleased with the money. This was communicated by the husband to Mrs. Ford, who then made a note for $300.
The money was paid to her. Within the week following she handed
the money to her husband, who invested it in his busines.
Moorehead for Plaintiff.
Ridgway for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
HERING, J. The defendant, Sarah Ford, is a married woman.
Her husband desiring a loan of $300, approached the plaintiff,
Atkins, with an offer of his note with his wife as surety. Atkins
declined the same, but said if Mrs. Ford desired a loan of $300,
she could have it on her note, and could do what she pleased with
the money, inefrring that she coudl give it to her husband. The
husband then communicated the facts to his wife. Thus the testimony shows that the husband of the defendant transacted the
entire business except the actual writing of the note by the wife.
The ,husband first seeking a loan on his own note with his wife as
surety, upon refusal of same, secured the loan for his wife. The
facts show that the plaintiff and defendant never met each other,
and all transactions were carried on between the plaintiff and defendant's husband. It si also evident that the defendant received
nothing, for there is uncontradicted testimony that the wife imme-
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diately turned the money over to her husband for his own use upon receipt of same, and that the plaintiff had previous knowledge
that she would in all likelihood do so upon receipt of the loan.
In view of these facts, the defendant alleges that the note was
given to secure money for her husband, and that she was simply
accommodation maker for him ,thereby putting herself within that
provision of the married woman's act of 1893, P. L. 344 which holds
in part that a married woman "may not become accommodation endorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another." If the defendant,
Mrs. Ford, falls within this section, naturally the note is void and
the plaintiff cannot recover.
Formerly, the capacity of a married woman to contract was
limited and her disability to do so general. Since the passage,
however, of the recent act of 1893, the disability to contract is exceptional and her capacity to do so is general. The defendant has
sought, as she rightfully should, to bring the case within one of the
few exceptions.
In a case of this kind, the liability is not determined alone by
the form of the obligation.The statute evidently intended to protect
married women from certain perils when it made the exceptions as
to suretyship and accommodation indorser, maker, etc., and certainly no court can allow a statute to be wholly defeated by a mere
subterfuge as in this case, for this woman was clearly an accommodation maker for her husband in fact if not in form. If the object
was to evade the disability created by the statute, and it has clearly
been shown that this was the case, then the fact and not the form
will determine her liability. In Real Estate Co. v. Roop, 132 Pa.
496, a similar case to the one at bar, it was held concerning a judgment note signed by both husband and wife, "If not given as surety
for her husband, it was given upon his importunity, and to aid him
in his business, one of the very perils from which the law ought to
protect a married woman.
We are inclined to believe that the transaction was continuous,
a subterfuge known to both plaintiff and the husband, to obtain
the money and bind the wife's property, and we think the ruling of
Patrick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526 applies here, which held;
whole transaction was a transparent device adopted by the plaintiff
and the husband, to evade an express statutory enactment, to create
by form a liability, when by law none in fact existed." As she received no benefit, and as the plaintiff was in no way deceived, she
was under neither moral nor legal obligation to pay, and there
should have been no verdict against her." Oswald v. Jones, 254
Pa. 32, a case in point with the one at bar also adopted the above
ruling.
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This court will not give its aid to any subterfuge or device to
avoid the expressed provisions and intentions of a statute, and
therefore r enders a judgment in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The contractual incapacity, at common law, of a married
woman is, with a few exceptions, abolished by the acts of 1887 and
1893; Steffen v. Smith 159 Pa. 207. "She may not," says the act
of 1893, P. L. 344, "become accommodation endorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another."
Mrs. Ford has not become surety or guarantor for her husband,
for he has assumed no liability whatever to Atkins. Nor is she an
indorser for him. Is she then an "accommodation maker?"
She is a maker. She is the sole party, obligor, to the note.
Did she make for the husband's accommodation? The negotiable
Instruments act says that "An accommodation party is one who
has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or endorser,
without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending
his name to some other person." But there are cases in which the
accommodated person does not become a party to the note or bond.
Cf XXIV. Dickinson Law Review, passim.
Mrs. Ford made the note in order to put the money advanced
on it, into the hands of her husband. It matters not whether the
owner gave him directly the money, or whether he gave it to her in
order that she might, or with knowledge that she would, transfer it
to him! Patrick v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526; The case of Oswald v. Jones,
254 Pa. 33 is essentially indistinguishable from the one before us.
The judgment of the learned court below must then be affirmed.
NATIONAL BANK vs. HENDERSON
Promissory Note-Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901-Holder in
Due Course-Burden of Proof
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X, indebted to the plaintiff to the extent of $15,000. The
plaintiff demanded payment, but agreed to accept a note of X
with indorsement of Henderson, as such. Henderson refused to
indorse until X told him that the proceeds would be used in paying a debt to P. He was assured that the proceeds would be so
used, and he endorsed. The cashier of the plaintiff bank swore
that he was the' agent for discounting the note, and that he had
no knowledge of the fraud practiced on Henderson. X and Henderson swore that they had not communicated their agreement to
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the cashier. It did not appear that the discounting was submitted
to the bank's directors for decision.
Snyder, for plaintiff.
Unger, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
SAUL, J. The questions involved in this case can be decided
entirely under the Negotiable Instruments Act of May 16, 1901.
After a careful consideration of the facts of the case at bar, we
find that these questions present themselves for determination.
First, was the title of the person negotiating the instrument defective? Second, was it diverted from its intended use? Third,
was the plaintiff bank a holder in due course? Fourth, on whom
was the burden to prove that it acquired the title as a holder in
due course?
Section 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads as follows: "The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is
defective within the meaning of the act when he obtains the instrument or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and
fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration,
or W hen he negotiates in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud." The defendant's own evidence, and
that of X, his witness, does not disclose any facts within the
knowledge of the plaintiff, or its officers, bringing notice or
knowledge home to it or them of any irregularity affecting the
validity of the note. On the contrary, the testimony of X corroborates that of the plaintiff's witnesses, and tends strongly to
establish the fact that the National Bank acquired the note upon
which the suit is brought for value in due course and without
notice .or knowledge of any facts which would justify a finding
otherwise.
The evidence of the cashier, Henderson and X combined,
negatived the idea of bad faith, false representation, or knowledge of the diversion of the note from its intended purpose. It
appears that there was no conflicting testimony.
Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Act defines a holder in due course, as follows: "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face.
(2) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue
and without notice that it had been previouusly dishonored, if
such was the fact.
,
(3) That he took it in good faith and for value.
(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him, 'he had no no-
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tice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating it."
The evidence as to whether the Bank received the note in good
faith and without notice of any defect in the title depends upon
the credibility of the witnesses. In 196 Pa. 610 it was held that as
long as the credibility of the witnesses was not in dispute, it. was
the duty of the court to render a verdict and a submittance to.the
jury was unnecessary. The good faith, spoken of in sub-division
three of Section 52, seems to describe in positive terms the requisite of a holder in due course under subdivision four "that at
the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
The burden of proving that it acquired the title as a holder
in due course was upon the Bank under Section 59 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, which reads: "Every holder is deemed prima
facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the
title of any person who has negotiqted the instrument was detive, the burden is on the 'holder to prove that he or some person
under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course.
The plaintiff so proved by producing its cashier, X and Henderson. The cashier swore positively that he knew nothing of any
fraudulent representations or any diversion of the note, and X and
Henderson swore that they had not communicated their agreement to the cashier.
In Second National Bank vs. Hoffman, 229 Pa. 429 the facts
are identical, except that in the present suit the testimony of the
witnesses have not in any way been contradicted, therefore, the
outcome of the case must be decided differently, and a verdict
must be rendered accordingly in favor of the plaintiff.
The present suit by the plaintiff Bank ratifies the act of the
cashier and the question that the discounting was not submitted
to the bank's directors for decision does not enter into this case.
AFFIRMED, for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Bank discounted a note, with the indorsement of the defendant upon it. The discounting was done solely by the chasier.
The Bank would be affected with any notice which he had, of the
fraud upon Henderson. But that he had such notice is negatived
by his testimony, of which there is no contradiction, either by
circumstance or by other testimony, and of which there is corroboration. Since, then, the Bank is a bona fide purchaser, the fraud
practiced by X upon Henderson cannot impair its right to recover
if it was a purchaser for value.
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The Bank accepted the note after a demand of payment of
the existing debt. The note was probably taken in payment. If
so, the Bank was a holder for value. But, even if it received the
nqte only as additional security for the existing debt, it would be
a holder for value. The Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 25
says: "An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value and
is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or
at a future time."
The opinion of the learned trial court fully sustains its decision.
AFFIRMED.
AMOS v. FIRE INSURANCE CO.
Policy-Cancellation by Mutual Consent-Right to
Terminate, Reserved in Policy
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amos took insurance, of $1500 on his factory, in
each case of two companies, one of which was the defendant. The policy allowed the company to cancel it upon giving a
week's notice. Defendant gave this notice on July 11, 1919. A
fire occurred totally destroying the factory on July 12, 1919. The
loss was $800. On July 11, Amos obtained another insurance policy for $1500 in the X Co. This company, and the Y Co. have
each paid $1500 to Amos. The defendant has refused to pay, alleging that the notice to cancel, followed by the procurement within a week of a smilar amount of insurance cancelled the policy
before the happening of the fire.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BARTRAM, J. This is an action of assumpsit on a fire insurance poilcy. The affidavit of defense admits the issuance of the
policy, but avers substantially as follows: that on July 11, 1919,
the defendant company gave the plaintiff a week's notice of its
intention to cancel the policy; that after the notice and before the
loss the plaintiff procured a policy for the same amount with the
X Co. with the intention that it should be a substitute for the
defendant's policy and was not for the purpose of over insuring
the factory.
There is no averment either pro or con as to any stipulation
in the policy as to the effect that the prior-that is defendantcompany was to have been informed of plaintiff's intention to take
out another policy with any other company. To this fact we shall
assume that no statement to provide notice was required.
We think the defendant's brief is insufficient because a policy
Insurance
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of fire insurance is a contract of indemnity, and unless it is cancelled by mutual consent, or the policy provides that it may be
terminated on the -option of the parties, and is so terminated, it
will continue in force for the term for which it was written. If the
right to terminate it is reserved in the policy, the conditions upon
which it is to be exercised are to be strictly complied with; and if,
as in this case, a week's notice is required the policy will still remain in force and cancellation will not take effect until exporation
of the time named in the notice.
We admit that this is also a question of double insurance.
Double insurance takes place where the insured makes two or
more policies on the same risk or property. The insurers in such a
case are liable pro rata and are entitled to contribution to equalize the payments made on account of losses, Sloat vs. Royal Insurance Co. 49 Pa. 14. This case the defendant relies on to defeat
his obligation to pay as there was a double insurance, but we must
overrule this contention. There was no over insurance in this
case as the total amount of policies was $4500, being less than
$8000, the total loss of the plant.
It is conceded that defendant would be liable on its policy if the
assured had not taken the X Co. policy.
There is no averment
that the latter policy was to be a substitute for the defendants
policy by the consent of the plaintiff and defendant. It is most
certain that mutual agreements to this effect would absolutely relieve the defendant from all liability.
We
shall conclude
our opinion
by
citing
Penn
Plate Glass Co. vs. Spring Garden Insurance Co., which held
that where a policy of insurance stipulated for cancellation on
a five day's notice and the loss occurred on the fifth day, the plaintiff could recover for the reason that the hour when the fire occurred was within five days, of the giving of the notice.
The defendant says that where the insured is notified of the
cancellation and at once takes out insurance for the same amount
in another company, he cannot recover from the first company
for loss occurring before the expiration of the period indicated
by notice. But Anfield vs. Guardian Insurance Co. 172 Pa. 605
says this is true only when the defendant company is notified to
that effect and is expressly relieved by consent of the plaintiff at
the time of notice of cancellation.
The conclusion thus reached by the court, not without a feeling that the contrary is supported by obvious considerations of
fairness and expediency, is that there are sufficient facts and reasons for a certificate of judgment to be rendered the plaintiff.
Judgment for $1500.00.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
But for the cancellation of the defendant's policy there would
be no contention that it is not liable. The company had reserved
the right to cancel on giving a week's notice. It gave that notice.
The policy then terminated at the end of the week but not before.
The fire occurred within the week while the policy was operative.
The Company then must pay unless the act of the .plaintiff with
respect to a new policy has discharged it.
The notice of cancellation was given on July 11th. The policy
would then cease on July 18th.
It happens that on the day after
the notice was given, that is, on July 12th a new policy was taken
out, for the same amount. The defendant alleges that this was a
release of its policy, six days before it would expire. But why?
Is a gratuity to the defendant to be assumed to be intended?
The defendant gave no consideration. The value of the property
was in excess of 8,000. The insurance on it was only $3,000.
That the plaintiff desired to increage it to $4500 is not improbable.
There is no reason for inferring an intention to do otherwise. Nor
is there any principle of law which would annul the defendant's
policy, because, at the point of its extinction another policy of the
same amount was secured. Besides the cases mentioned by the
learned court below, Schell v. The German American Ins. Co., 228
Pa. 44, may be considered.
AFFIRMED.

